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Abstract
The private healthcare sector in low- and middle-income countries is increasingly seen as of public
health importance, with widespread interest in improving private provider engagement. However,
there is relatively little literature providing an in-depth understanding of the operation of private
providers. We conducted a mixed methods analysis of the nature of competition faced by private
delivery providers in Uttar Pradesh, India, where maternal mortality remains very high. We
mapped health facilities in five contrasting districts, surveyed private facilities providing deliveries
and conducted in-depth interviews with facility staff, allied providers (e.g. ambulance drivers,
pathology laboratories) and other key informants. Over 3800 private facilities were mapped, of
which 8% reported providing deliveries, mostly clustered in cities and larger towns. 89% of delivery
facilities provided C-sections, but over half were not registered. Facilities were generally small, and
the majority were independently owned, mostly by medical doctors and, to a lesser extent, AYUSH
(non-biomedical) providers and others without formal qualifications. Recent growth in facility
numbers had led to intense competition, particularly among mid-level facilities where customers
were more price sensitive. In all facilities, nearly all payment was out-of-pocket, with very low-
insurance coverage. Non-price competition was a key feature of the market and included location
(preferably on highways or close to government facilities), medical infrastructure, hotel features,
staff qualifications and reputation, and marketing. There was heavy reliance on visiting consultants
such as obstetricians, surgeons and anaesthetists, and payment of hefty commission payments
to agents who brought clients to the facility, for both new patients and those transferring from
public facilities. Building on these insights, strategies for private sector engagement could include
a foundation of universal facility registration, adaptation of accreditation schemes to lower-level
facilities, improved third-party payment mechanisms and strategic purchasing, and enhanced
patient information on facility availability, costs and quality.
Keywords: Private sector, private providers, delivery care, maternal health, economics, competition, India, Uttar Pradesh,
public–private engagement
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Introduction
In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) the public health im-
portance of the private healthcare sector is increasingly noted, given its
current role in provision, and potential role in Universal Health
Coverage (Mcpake and Hanson, 2016). Though there is considerable
cross-country heterogeneity, the private sector often accounts for over
25% of curative care and sometimes over 50% (Mackintosh et al.,
2016), and on average 40% of maternal healthcare (Campbell et al.,
2016a). There is widespread interest in improving strategies for private
provider engagement, e.g. through enhanced regulation, government
purchasing, quality improvement networks or social accountability
(Montagu et al., 2016), and a gradually growing literature document-
ing private sector market share, clientele and quality, and evaluating
private sector interventions (Montagu and Goodman, 2016; Morgan
et al., 2016). However, there is relatively little in-depth assessment of
the operation of LMIC private providers, the incentives they face and
the competitive strategies they employ (Bautista, 1995; Bennett, 1996;
Kamat and Nichter, 1998; Nakamba et al., 2002; Goodman, 2004;
Jeffery and Jeffery, 2008; George and Iyer, 2013; Gautham et al.,
2014; Tsevelvaanchig et al., 2017). An enhanced understanding of the
nature of competition in these markets can assist policy and pro-
gramme decision-makers in anticipating the challenges associated with
private sector functioning and in designing strategies for engaging with
private providers that are appropriate and incentive-compatible.
In this article, we focus on private provision of delivery care. A
key strategy to reduce maternal mortality has been increased skilled
birth attendance, primarily through delivery at health facilities
(Campbell et al., 2006). However, facility deliveries do not improve
outcomes if quality of care is poor, so it is essential that maternity
facilities have the required infrastructure, skilled staff, and emer-
gency obstetric capacity and/or functioning referral mechanisms
(Goldenberg and Mcclure, 2017). In practice, there are major con-
cerns about the quality of delivery care in both public and private
facilities (Sharma et al., 2015; Campbell et al., 2016b).
The private sector dominates healthcare delivery in India
(Mackintosh et al., 2016), and while private facility use is lower for
delivery than for curative care, it is still substantial and increasing.
The percentage of deliveries occurring in facilities increased from
39% to 79% between 2005–06 and 2015–16 (Indian Institute for
Population Studies, 2016). Much of this increase reflects increased
public facility use, attributed to the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) fi-
nancial incentive scheme for community health workers (termed
ASHAs) and women (Lim et al., 2010), together with free public
ambulance services (Babiarz et al., 2016). However, private sector
deliveries also increased, now accounting for over a quarter of births
(20.7% in rural and 42.5% in urban India) (Indian Institute for
Population Studies, 2016). Several studies have documented the
availability and structural quality of private emergency obstetric
services in India (Mony et al., 2013; Jayanna et al., 2014; Sabde
et al., 2014; Salazar et al., 2016), but no studies were identified on
the competitive environment and strategies of these providers.
This study aims to address this gap, by providing an analysis of
the nature of competition faced by private delivery providers in
Uttar Pradesh, particularly exploring the roles of price and non-
price competition, and the implications for accessibility and quality.
We draw on both quantitative and qualitative methods, in order to
combine a detailed description of the market structure and provider
characteristics with in-depth analysis of competitive strategies and
exploration of commercially and legally sensitive topics.
Methods
Study setting
With a population of over 220 million, Uttar Pradesh is India’s most
populous state (Government of Uttar Pradesh, 2015), with 29% of
the population below the poverty line compared with the all India
average of 22% (Government of India, 2011–12). Although pre-
dominantly rural (77%), eight of its cities contain over 1 million
people (Government of India, 2011). Delivery outcomes are poor,
with a maternal mortality rate of 201 per 100 000 births compared
with the Indian average of 130 (Government of India, 2018), and an
infant mortality rate of 64 per 1000 compared with the Indian aver-
age of 41 (Indian Institute for Population Studies, 2016).
We selected three contrasting study sites, providing variation in
socio-economic status, proximity to large cities and religious orien-
tation: (1) two zones of Kanpur City (KC) (which comprises the
major portion of Kanpur Nagar district), one a relatively high-in-
come zone and one lower income; (2) the contiguous mostly rural
districts of Kannauj and Kanpur Dehat (KKD); and (3) the contigu-
ous districts of Bareilly and Rampur (BR), which have a relatively
large Muslim population. In 2012, use of private facilities for deliv-
ery ranged from 10% of births in Kanpur Dehat, to 15% in
Kannauj, 23% in Bareilly and 27% in both Kanpur City and
Rampur (Government of India, 2014), and has likely risen further
since.
Key Messages
• The private healthcare sector is an important provider of maternity care in low- and middle-income countries but there
is relatively little literature providing an in-depth understanding of the operation of these providers.
• Delivery facilities in Uttar Pradesh formed part of a rapidly expanding and heterogeneous market, segmented by com-
plexity of care and socio-economic status of clientele; most facilities were small and independently owned, generally
clustered in cities and larger towns and over half were not registered.
• To address strong competition from both the public sector and other private providers, facilities employed a range of
price and non-price strategies; key elements of non-price competition included location, medical infrastructure, hotel fea-
tures, staff qualification and reputation, and marketing.
• Concerns include lack of care for complex deliveries in less urban areas, limited affordability of private facilities, a lack
of appropriate medical professionals and qualified nurses on staff leading to heavy reliance on visiting consultants, and
high commission payments to agents who brought clients to the facility, for both new patients and those transferring
from public facilities.
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Public delivery facilities include Primary Health Centres which
should perform normal deliveries, Community Health Centres
which should perform C-sections (though in practice <20% may
have this capacity (International Institute for Population Sciences,
2010), and district or higher level hospitals which should provide
comprehensive emergency obstetric care. Private providers include
allopathic (western medical) practitioners, and practitioners of alter-
native medicine systems collectively termed AYUSH (Ayurveda,
Unani, Siddha, Homeopathy), who often also practice allopathic
medicine. Unqualified and non-degree providers, termed Rural
Medical Practitioners (RMPs) or ‘informal providers’ are also com-
mon outpatient providers, and some have small inpatient facilities
(George and Iyer, 2013; Gautham et al., 2014).
Conceptualizing competition
Markets vary from the most competitive (with many sellers of
similar products sold at a common price with minimal profits), to
the other extreme of few sellers with considerable discretion over
price. Most healthcare markets fall somewhere between these
extremes in the realm of imperfect or monopolistic competition,
which takes place between a substantial number of providers whose
services are good but not perfect substitutes for each other (Dranove
and Satterthwaite, 2000). However, there is considerable variation
in the nature and intensity of competition within such healthcare
markets, depending e.g. on the price sensitivity of consumers, their
ability to observe quality, the degree of product differentiation/
market segmentation, barriers to entering the market, and local lev-
els of market concentration (Clarke, 1985; Scherer and Ross, 1990;
Jacobs, 1997). These market characteristics affect the way providers
compete, both in terms of price and non-price factors, and these var-
iations in competition in turn can have substantial implications for
the performance of such markets in terms of accessibility and quality
of care. We use this competition ‘lens’ to understand the market for
delivery care, investigating (1) the market structure in terms of the
number and types of facilities and their characteristics, (2) the inten-
sity and nature of price competition and (3) non-price competition
strategies such as product differentiation and promotion.
Data collection and analysis
We followed a sequential and explanatory mixed methods design
(Creswell et al., 2003), starting with a quantitative phase followed
by a qualitative phase with some overlap between the two phases.
The quantitative phase was designed to obtain the broad character-
istics of the market and private facilities and provide a sampling
frame that would allow us to purposively sample private facilities
for the in-depth interviews (IDIs) in the qualitative phase. The quali-
tative phase was designed to explore the competitive strategies
and business practices in the delivery care market. Data analysis
followed an iterative process with, e.g. the market segmentation
themes suggested in the qualitative interviews used for categorizing
the facilities in the survey dataset. Qualitative data were also used to
triangulate with quantitative data on pricing, staff and referrals,
besides providing an in-depth understanding of private provider
conduct.
Quantitative phase
A key challenge was the lack of a complete sampling frame of
private facilities, due to incomplete government registration. We
therefore began by systematically mapping all public and private
facilities in our study sites, recording whether they appeared to pro-
vide deliveries. We defined ‘facilities’ as providers of clinical services
operating from a fixed location, including public, for-profit and
charitable/trust entities, and all systems of medicine. The mapping
was conducted in February to April 2016, by walking or driving
down every street and alley, verifying the location of facilities listed
on government registers and the internet and identifying others. In
Kanpur City, the mapping was conducted throughout the two
selected zones; in the other sites, we mapped the district and block
towns only, as the vast majority of facilities were reported to be in
these peri-urban centres.
We used the mapping data to identify all private facilities con-
ducting deliveries, and conducted a survey of all of these in March
to May 2016. We visited all 410 recorded as providing deliveries
during the mapping and completed surveys for 262. Of the 148 not
interviewed, 7 were not found or vacant, 1 was involved in data col-
lection for another study and 27 refused. A much higher number
(113) were deemed ineligible because they said they did not provide
deliveries. When contacted by senior research staff, most said they
provided maternal healthcare but did not conduct deliveries on site.
However, it is likely that a few denied providing deliveries to avoid
our survey, or because they were concerned about regulatory viola-
tions. The true refusal rate may therefore be higher than the 9.3% of
facilities reporting providing delivery care.
The private facility survey covered facility characteristics, infra-
structure, type of staff, services provided, availability of equipment
and medicines, cases seen, referral practices, links with allied service
providers, participation in programmes/associations, and prices
charged for delivery. Where possible the clinician in charge of
delivery services (often the owner or medical superintendent) was
interviewed. Where this person was very busy, some sections of the
questionnaire (on infrastructure and business practices) were
answered by a manager, but we made every effort to ask the ques-
tions related to clinical care of a staff member responsible for deliv-
eries. The survey was piloted on facilities outside the study sites.
Analysis was conducted in Stata 14.0. As we aimed to include all
delivery facilities, rather than taking a sample, confidence intervals
are not presented.
Qualitative phase
From April to October 2016, semi-structured IDIs were conducted
with:
• Private delivery facility owners/managers (n ¼ 34), purposively
selected from the surveyed facilities to provide variation in terms
of number of beds and deliveries, staffing, whether they per-
formed C-sections, rural/urban location, owner’s religion, pri-
vate-for-profit v. charitable status, time in operation and prices
charged for deliveries. We aimed to interview the person most
involved with the management of the maternal health services
business.
• Allied providers who interacted with private delivery facilities (n
¼ 46), such as ambulance drivers/owners, visiting consultants,
staff from medical stores, diagnostic centres and blood banks,
smaller-scale rural private clinics, ASHAs and Dais (traditional
birth attendants). These were identified through suggestions pro-
vided by facility staff during the survey and IDIs, visiting local
diagnostic centres and medical stores, and snowballing from al-
lied providers interviewed.
• Stakeholders at the State and District/Ward level (n ¼ 12), from
Government health services, professional associations and
NGOs who were engaged with private sector policies and
programmes.
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IDIs were conducted in Hindi or English by senior team mem-
bers, lasting 1 to 3 h. Considering the legal and commercial sensitiv-
ity of the information, we took care to reassure respondents about
maintaining confidentiality, and for some questions, asked about
their perceptions of other providers’ behaviours rather their own.
Audio recordings were permitted for 18 IDIs and 7 stakeholder
interviews, with detailed notes taken for the others. The note-takers
translated the Hindi transcripts and detailed notes into English;
these were reviewed by two senior research team members to ensure
translation accuracy. Data were analysed using the framework ap-
proach (Ritchie et al., 2013). Translated transcripts and detailed
notes were read by two team members to develop a coding structure
reflecting both the literature on competition (deductive approach)
and issues arising from the data (inductive approach). Data were
coded using NVivo, and commonly occurring themes and sub-
themes were identified.
Ethical approval was obtained from the Institutional Review
Boards of LSHTM and Centre for Media Studies (CMS-IRB), New
Delhi. Informed oral consent was obtained from all interviewees.
Results
Market structure
In total 3976 healthcare facilities were mapped, of which 96% were
private-for-profit, 1% not-for-profit and 3% public (Supplementary
Table S1). Most private facilities were outpatient clinics run by doc-
tors or AYUSH practitioners. Only around 9% of all facilities
provided deliveries (n¼368), of which 80% were private-for-profit,
1% private not-for-profit and 19% government.
We developed a typology of private delivery facilities, based pri-
marily on the IDIs. The respondents had various ways of grouping
facilities, but the most prominent was by sophistication of delivery
services:
They (facilities) can be divided into small with only normal deliv-
eries, second which do normal and C sections. . .nursing homes
which can take some complicated cases, and bigger hospitals
which provide specialized care to complicated cases (High-level
facility 3, KC).
We thus grouped private facilities into three broad categories:
high-level facilities with intensive care units (ICU); mid-level facili-
ties which conducted C-sections but had no ICU; and low-level
facilities which only conducted normal deliveries. This categoriza-
tion is not perfect as the standard of intensive care varies widely and
some facilities may fear admitting to performing C-sections.
However, the typology was useful for understanding the commonal-
ities and heterogeneity within the market. It also corresponded with
reported socio-economic status of clientele, with high-level facilities
said to serve the wealthy upper and upper-middle class (described by
one high-level facility respondent as the ‘stinking rich’), mid-level
facilities serving middle-income clients (described as those with an
income of INR 15 000-20 000/USD 233-310 per month), and low-
level facilities serving the lower-middle classes. While a couple of
Figure 1 (a) Kanpur City Zones 1 and 2 (n ¼ 1 low-level, 26 mid-level, 27 high level, 2 government). (b) Kanauj and Kanpur Dehat districts (n ¼ 6 low-level, 17 mid-
level, 3 high-level, 31 government). (c) Bareilly and Rampur districts (n ¼ 22 low-level, 70 mid-level, 90 high-level, 38 government).
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low-level private facilities were staffed by Dais, in general they were
said to conduct very few deliveries these days, reflecting the role of
JSY in encouraging poorer women to use public facilities. JSY and
free government ambulances were also said to have attracted many
patients away from other low- and mid-level facilities, but not to
have affected demand for high-level facilities.
Figure 1a–c shows the location of private delivery facilities by
category (and also government facilities) in each study site. Private
facilities were heavily concentrated in the urban areas of Kanpur
city, Bareilly city and Rampur town, where they massively out-
numbered government facilities (e.g. 65:2 in the Kanpur city Zones).
Outside these major urban areas, private and government delivery
facilities were more similar in number (e.g. 1.5:1 in Kannauj and
Kanpur Dehat). Most private facilities were mid-level (43%) or high
level (46%), meaning that 89% provided C-sections. Only 11%
were low level, mainly located in Kannauj, Bareilly and Rampur.
There was evidence of substantial recent entry in to the market:
while almost half the private facilities had been in operation for over
a decade (Table 1), around a fifth of high-level facilities and a third
of mid- and low-facilities had opened within the past 5 years:
When we started in 1993 there were only a few hospitals. Now
there are 16-17 within a radius of 5 kms (High-level facility 3,
KC).
However, respondents also noted that some rural areas remained
very under-served, with limited capacity to manage birth complica-
tions in either the Government or private sector.
Ownership of private delivery facilities was overwhelmingly by
individuals or partnerships (mainly husband and wife) (Table 1).
Commercial chains were almost entirely absent from the market,
with only 6% of owners having more than one facility, most com-
monly two. Most were owned by medical doctors (70%) with
MBBS or MD degrees, though 17% of owners had AYUSH qualifi-
cations, and 15% had unrecognized diplomas and certificates in
nursing or AYUSH or no health qualifications. Among the 76 facili-
ties not owned by medical doctors, 75% reported employing at least
one doctor on staff, though it is likely that some reported visiting
consultants as staff members out of regulatory concerns.
Over half the facilities were not on the registration list held by
the Chief Medical Officer, with registration particularly low among
low-level facilities (8%). Only 22% reported being a member of the
national obstetrics and gynaecology association (FOGSI), with this
most common among high-level facilities. Membership of maternal
health social franchise networks was very rare (4%), very few had
received any recent delivery-related training (3%), and only three or
four high-level hospitals were accredited with national bodies, with
accreditation reported to be out of reach for most of the market.
Most facilities were relatively small, with a median of 15 beds.
Nearly all low-level facilities had 10 or fewer beds, but 30% of
high-level facilities had over 30, and 6% (seven facilities) had over
100. Private rooms were offered at 89% of facilities, with a median
of four rooms; however, less than half of low-level facilities had pri-
vate rooms. Availability of other infrastructure and equipment is
shown in Table 1.
The typical number of private facility deliveries reported per
month was low, with a median of 10 normal deliveries and four C-
sections (in contrast some public facilities were said to conduct over
200). It is possible that facilities under-reported these figures, per-
haps out of concern that the information might be relayed to tax
authorities, but they likely give a picture of the general scale of oper-
ation. Both high- and mid-level facilities accounted for substantial
shares of private deliveries (Figure 2), though high-level facilities
were much less common in the more rural districts of Kanpur Dehat
and Kannauj. While low-level facilities made up 11% of facilities
they only accounted for 3.5% of private deliveries (Figure 2). To
give a rough indication of market concentration in each district, we
calculated the share of reported private sector deliveries accounted
for by the five facilities with the highest utilization. The top five
facilities were responsible for over half of private deliveries in
Kanpur Dehat (84%), Kannauj (70%) and Rampur (54%), com-
pared with 33% in Kanpur City, and only 10% in Bareilly.
Pricing
Private sector deliveries were usually priced as all-inclusive ‘pack-
ages’ including clinical care, hotel aspects, medicines and tests.
There were different package rates for normal and caesarean deliv-
eries, and for general wards and private rooms. Rates could also be
higher for patients with likely complications, e.g. due to
hypertension.
Based on survey responses, a normal delivery was on average
USD 67 (INR 4500) in a general ward and USD 97 (INR 6500) in a
private room, and a C-section USD 165 (INR 11 000) and USD 202
(INR 13 500), respectively (Table 2). Survey respondents reported
relatively minor differences across facility categories, with the me-
dian price of a normal delivery only USD 15 higher in a high-level
than a low-level facility. However, during IDIs much higher upper-
ranges were given for high-level facilities, up to USD 373 (INR
25 000) for normal deliveries and USD 1492 (INR 100 000) for C-
sections, perhaps indicating that prices reported under survey condi-
tions may be biased downwards, particularly for higher-end
facilities.
Most respondents from all facility categories spoke about the
need to conform to local market rates to remain competitive, with a
few actively surveying competitors’ prices. One facility’s low rates
could have a major effect on the market:
Because of X Hospital (a mid-level private facility), no one can
change the rates. They charge minimum for the delivery cases. X
hospital has ruined the market of entire Kannauj (Mid-level facil-
ity 13, KKD).
Within a facility the package rate could vary across patients by a
few thousand rupees (USD 15–30) but a couple of facilities reported
higher variations (INR 7000-10 000/USD 105–150). Patients were
said to demand discounts, based on their financial constraints or in
some cases political connections. Smaller hospitals in the city out-
skirts and in rural block towns seemed to face particularly strong
pressure, with a few reporting that patients and relatives could cre-
ate a ‘nuisance’ when their request was turned down, though several
facilities said they did adjust their prices to patients’ paying capacity.
Due to these flexible rates, it was also common to avoid giving bills
to patients:
If you make a bill then you will not be able to justify about the
charges, like you charged 13000 from Rekha Devi for general
ward and so why did you charge 15000 from Shyama Devi. It
demands an explanation. How did you calculate? So you can be
caught in an audit (financial comparison). So if there is no bill,
then there is no audit (Mid-level facility 15, KKD).
The vast majority of patients paid in cash. Around a fifth of
mid- and high-level facilities were enrolled in the government
health insurance scheme for poorer groups, Rashtriya Swasthya
Beema Yojana (RSBY) (http://www.rsby.gov.in/how_works.html).
However, many facilities no longer participated due to low
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reimbursement rates, burdensome paperwork, and difficulties
obtaining payments, including requests for bribes. Only a few, main-
ly high-end facilities, were empanelled in other public (8%) or
private (4%) insurance schemes, termed TPAs (Third-Party
Administrators). Some higher-end facilities were empanelled with as
many as 20 schemes, but even in these facilities over 90% of clients
were uninsured and paid out-of-pocket. Respondents at a few mid-
level facilities expressed interest in TPA affiliation, but faced
obstacles reaching the standards demanded, e.g. for ‘private rooms,
air conditioners in the rooms and television’. Low-level facilities
were not even aware of the insurance schemes.
Non-price competition
The IDIs revealed five key dimensions of non-price competition be-
tween private facilities: location, medical infrastructure, hotel fea-
tures, staffing and marketing including commission payments.
Location
Location was considered vital in influencing demand. Mid-level facili-
ties often located on main roads leading into large towns (Figure 1a):
Table 1 Characteristics of private delivery facilities, by type
Low level Mid-level High level Total
(N¼ 29) (N¼ 113) (N¼ 120) (N¼ 262)
Ownership type (%)
Individual 86.2 70.8 71.7 72.9
Partnership 13.8 23.9 22.5 22.1
Company (Private Ltd or Public Ltd) 0 0 5.0 2.3
Faith-based or other not-for-profit 0 5.3 0.8 2.7
Owner lives at facility (%) 62.1 36.4 39.2 40.5
At least one female owner (%) 55.2 33.9 30.0 34.5
Medical qualification of owner(s)a (%)
Medical doctor 34.4 72.8 78.4 70.3
AYUSH (BAMS, BUMS, BHMS) 44.8 13.6 12.5 16.6
Otherb 10.3 9.1 4.2 7.0
None 13.8 6.4 8.3 8.1
Infrastructure and equipment (%)
Mains electricity connection 96.6 100 100 99.6
Back-up electricity source 92.3 97.3 99.2 97.6
Wired phone line or mobile phone 86.2 92.9 99.2 95.0
Internet connection 44.8 67.0 90.8 75.5
Ambulance 0 0.9 11.9 5.8
Pick-up van 0 20.4 28.8 21.9
Operating theatre 24.1 94.7 99.2 88.9
ICUc 0 0 100 45.8
Pathology 20.7 33.6 64.2 46.2
Ultrasound 7.1 39.6 65.0 47.9
Blood bank 0 4.6 5.0 4.3
In-house medical store 51.7 67.6 92.5 77.3
Government registration (%) 8.0 50.5 53.1 47.2
Network participation (%)
Federation of OBGYN Societies of India (FOGSI) 3.7 13.0 34.8 22.0
Member of maternal health social franchise 0 1.8 7.6 4.3
Delivery-related training within last 2 years 0 4.5 2.5 3.1
Bed and room numbers, median (IQR)
Number of inpatient beds 5 (2, 8) 10 (10, 18) 20 (13.5, 39.5) 15 (10, 24)
Number of private rooms 0 (0, 2) 3 (2, 4) 4.5 (3, 8) 4 (2, 6)
Delivery numbers per month, median (IQR)
All deliveries 4 (2, 6) 13 (7, 24) 18 (11, 30) 14 (7, 25)
Normal deliveries 4 (2, 6) 10 (4, 20) 12 (7, 20) 10 (5, 20)
C-sections 3 (2, 7) 5 (3, 8) 4 (3, 8)
Years in operation, median (IQR) 6 (4, 13) 8 (3, 14) 10 (6, 16) 9 (4, 15)
aSums to >100% as there may be more than one owner.
bIncludes Auxiliary Nurse Midwife, Bachelor of Electro Homeopathy & Surgery/BEMS, a range of diploma degrees, and unspecified qualifications.
cWe defined high-level facilities as those with an ICU.
Source: Private delivery facility survey.
Figure 2 Share of private deliveries by facility type and study site.
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This being a by-pass road, patients come here directly with ease,
majority of those are from rural areas who cannot afford costly
hospitals in the central part of the city (Medical store 1, BR).
It also made sense for facilities to locate in clusters, benefiting
from the area’s reputation for healthcare provision. Mid-level facili-
ties outside major towns tended to cluster close to government facili-
ties (Figure 1b, c); C-sections were rarely available in these
government facilities, so patients with complications were referred
to higher level government hospitals in the nearest major town.
However, patients were often reluctant to travel that far, and in-
stead preferred (or were encouraged by ASHAs or other agents) to
approach nearby private facilities.
. . ..the government is focusing on delivery services and patient is
going there free of cost as 108 (free ambulance) is there to carry
the patient to the hospital. When the patient gets referred, he
lands in the market. So, in the market, there is other also besides
me. So it is better opportunity to work here rather than anywhere
else (Mid-level facility 15, KKD).
Medical infrastructure
Variations in medical infrastructure were a key aspect of non-price
competition, such as operating theatres, ICUs and neo-natal ICUs
(NICUs):
Nowadays pregnant women visit hospitals during pregnancy and
they are well informed if there is going to be any complication
during delivery. So they prefer a hospital where there is facility of
surgery and blood. We also recommend same to such cases
(High-level facility 4, BR).
These days the system of NICU is running a lot. So some people
go more because they will get NICU facility. . . if they think there
is some trouble with the child (Ambulance driver 1, KC).
Perhaps most important was the capacity for C-sections, pro-
vided by 89% of private facilities (Table 1), particularly as this
allowed facilities to compete with the government sector. Survey
data indicated that on average close to 30% of private deliveries
were C-sections (Table 1), though for 2% (six facilities) this was
75% or more. Respondents attributed high C-section rates to client
preferences, together with a high-risk case-mix often attributed to
receiving referrals from other facilities, and less often to economic
incentives:
We get mainly high risk cases. So most of our deliveries are C-
secs. Also because SES (socio-economic status) are high, people
also want a planned surgery. . .. Because they don’t want to ex-
perience pain in normal delivery and simply say do surgery to
avoid those kind of problems (High-level facility 3, KC).
In case of Caesar, profit of hospital is more since patient stay is
more, ranging from 5 to 7 days. . . (High-level facility 12, KC).
In-house services were also said to give facilities a competitive
edge, particularly pathology, diagnostic imaging (especially ultra-
sound) and a medical store:
Yes, we have our ambulance, diagnostic services and a medical
store. In fact profit is less if these are done from outside. Here
they get each and every service under one roof like a shopping
mall (High-level facility 9, BR).
Hotel features
Hotel features such as furnishings, private rooms and customer ser-
vice were also central in attracting patients. Many high-level private
facilities offered luxury hotel-like accommodation that included a
variety of differently priced private rooms, some with air-
conditioning, television and en-suite bathrooms. Even mid- and low-
level facilities increasingly offered basic private rooms. These fea-
tures attracted patients from other private facilities, and from gov-
ernment facilities where hotel aspects were known to be poor.
Staff qualification and reputation
Staff with higher qualifications and good reputations provided a dis-
tinct competitive edge:
Irrespective of how many glasses (plate glass building fac¸ade)
you have put in the hospital. . .glass and story (number of floors)
do not matter. Qualification, education and facilities matter
(Mid-level facility 1, KC).
Reputation was built both on technical skills and compassion,
familiarity and trust gained over many years, almost establishing
clinicians as a brand:
Like while buying ‘surf’ powder—people ask give us Nirma
(Indian clothes detergent brand)—they do not say surf or deter-
gent powder. Similarly, in this area, Dr. XY’s name sells like
Nirma brand (Mid-level facility 10, KC).
Most important is that Sir [Dr. XX] himself see all the patients.
When he goes on rounds in the ward more than half of the pa-
tient gets cured just by seeing him. They feel that doctor himself
is coming to ask about their condition (Private Facility Public
Relations Officer (PRO) 1, KKD).
Reflecting women’s preferences, most obstetricians were female,
and female staff were also valued in low-level facilities without med-
ical doctors. While most facilities claimed to have a medical doctor
on staff and many an obstetrician, in practice nearly all mid- and
high-level facilities relied heavily on visiting consultants for delivery
care, with a median 5 and 7 consultants, respectively, particularly
obstetricians, anaesthetists and surgeons, who in turn were affiliated
with several hospitals:
We will be in touch with 3-4 anaesthesiologists (visiting consul-
tants). They also have 4-5 hospitals they go to. So if one is not
available then we call another (Professional association represen-
tative 1 and hospital owner, BR).
Table 2 Midpoint of price rangea for deliveries in private facilities
[USD, median (IQR)]
Low-level Mid-level High-level Total
(N¼ 29) (N¼ 113) (N¼ 120) (N¼ 262)
Normal deliveries
General ward 52 56 67 67
(52, 67) (49, 67) (52, 82) (52, 82)
Private rooms 90b 82 105 97
(67, 135) (67, 105) (82, 127) (82, 120)
C-Section deliveries
General ward 165 165 165
(135, 187) (165, 202) (135, 262)
Private rooms 202 217 202
(165, 236) (202, 258) (195, 247)
aSurvey respondents were asked the typical price range for delivery, and
the midpoint of these ranges was calculated. Based on the median of these
midpoints.
bLess than half of private primary facilities had private rooms (n¼ 11).
Source: Private delivery facility survey.
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Basically you have to increase the acquaintance with doctors so
that they give work. Right now I only have 4 hospitals. All these
hospitals are maternity only. Or else surgical/general (Consultant
1, BR).
One high-level facility providing advanced multi-specialty care
worked with over 90 consultants:
Other hospitals have many visiting consultants. . .. . . There is one
person there whose only work is to phone and call consultants
and maintain their accounts (Mid-level facility 8, KC).
These consultants operated on three different business models
(Box 1). In some cases consultants (and facility owners) reportedly
also held government posts, though such ‘dual practice’ was official-
ly outlawed.
Two thirds of low-level facilities also used visiting consultants,
but usually just one, generally for emergencies. In the more remote
areas with only low-level facilities, there was a critical shortage of
doctors, and patients were usually served by AYUSH providers,
nurses or unqualified staff. We also heard of low-level facilities pro-
viding surgical care without qualified medicks:
In X Hospital, Dr. Y, who is not qualified at all does the surgery
himself, even gives anaesthesia himself and thus saves money
there also (Mid-level facility 13, KKD).
Respondents noted the challenges of attracting doctors outside
larger cities, given the lack of infrastructure and economic
opportunities:
This is a very interior area sir. This is one of the cheapest regions
sir, and here doctor, MBBS doctor, isn’t there amongst us in the
private. The condition is not good here. There are no amenities
or facilities here. Big doctors are not able to get through their
expenses here so will they sit here? (RMP 1, KKD).
In both rural and urban areas, there were also major challenges
attracting other types of qualified staff, particularly nurses with
legitimate degrees and diplomas.
Marketing and commission payments
Most private facilities put considerable effort into promotion and
marketing. While some well-established facilities could rely on repu-
tation and word-of-mouth, newer facilities in particular used a range
of marketing strategies, with one mid-level facility noting ‘one has
to struggle to attract the patients’.
Mass print media such as hoardings and newspaper advertise-
ments were sometimes used, but said to be costly and were not
encouraged by the Medical Council of India. A more popular
approach was ‘health camps’, particularly for mid- and low-level
facilities. Camps were held close to rural communities or at the facil-
ity, with clinicians providing free services and medicines for certain
conditions, occasionally including maternal health. The camps were
partly seen as a charitable act, but also attracted patients to the
facility:
. . .. at [the camp] we give medicines free of cost for 1-2 days. So
what happens with that is that the patient gets impressed there,
and then that patient comes till here. . .. . .. If we see 100 patients
there, then 10 patients come to us within the next week. And
those patients we give special response to, who come through the
camp—30% off (Mid-level facility 1, KC).
Several large- and medium-sized facilities employed full-time
marketing agents, termed ‘PROs’ (public relations officers), whose
job was to increase patient business. They travelled around 50–100
villages, spreading information about their hospital’s services and
networking with local agents including Dais, ASHAs, ambulance
drivers and RMPs to draw in patients. A few PROs were well-
networked with health staff in in order to attract (informal)
referrals:
Sometimes in case of emergency or for better care, they (ASHAs)
directly bring cases to our hospitals. We provide them incentives
which ranges from R 1500 to 2500–3000 depending upon the
situation. I also establish contacts with the ASHAs to know the
status of pregnant women in their areas . . . mobilizing ASHAs to
come directly to our hospital (PRO 2, KKD).
One interviewee even reported this leading to PROs fighting
over patients outside a public hospital:
There was news recently that in xx hospital, people from private
sector were roaming. They were picking-up the patients. So what
happened was that a patient was approached from two hospitals
and they got engaged in a fight on the issue that the patient will
go to their respective hospitals. Means there were two dogs for a
single chapatti [Indian bread]! (Mid-level facility 15, KKD).
Payment of commission to agents for bringing new clients or
referrals was a very common feature of the market. IDI respondents
described the importance of commission payments or ‘cuts’, particu-
larly for private ambulance drivers, ASHAs and RMPs.
When they (ambulances) pick up a patient they call the (hospital)
management first that sir I’m getting a patient. What is it for?
For this. . .and tell me sir how much will you give me, what will
you give me? Then they say that okay sir, I’ll just let you know
(High-level facility 5, KC).
While some in-kind gifts were given, such as sweets or sarees for
ASHAs, financial commission payments were standard and large—
often 20–30% of the full patient fee.
Box 1 Business models for visiting consultants
Respondents outlined three business models for consul-
tants, though they could co-exist in one facility:
• Model 1—Consultants visit a facility regularly to con-
duct outpatient clinics, being paid a fixed amount
every month, or per patient.
• Model 2—Consultants are ‘on-call’, visiting a range of
facilities when required, receiving a fixed fee for ser-
vice (e.g. USD 30 for an anaesthetist), or an agreed
percent (e.g. 30–50% of the client’s total bill). Facilities
have a number of consultants on their books, to ensure
they can find one when needed. Some consultants
may also run their own hospitals or clinics.
• Model 3—Higher-end obstetricians have their own
outpatient practices where they enrol women for
antenatal care, but contract with one or more high-
level facilities, where they effectively rent services for
their patients’ deliveries (i.e. ward, operating theatre,
nursing staff and medicine costs). The consultant bills
the patient directly, or in some cases the patient pays
the hospital and doctor separately.
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There is one X hospital in this area, they get many delivery cases.
ASHA sends patients in large numbers to that hospital.
Everyone’s commission is set in advance. Every third month
(quarterly) there is party in ABC hotel for them (organized by X
Hospital). They arrange all sort of entertainment activities for
the invitees. They spend lakhs of rupees on a single day. These
ASHAs also get gifts—sweets and clothes (Medical store 1, BR).
To facilitate commission claims, one facility noted registration
numbers of ambulances bringing patients so they could be paid
afterwards:
Some people are honest in their work. Like X hospital, they
make a slip in the name of driver who drops the patients. What
they do is on a bill of Rs. 1 lakh they give Rs. 30,000 to private
drivers very honestly. They have installed CCTV and they note
down the ambulance driver vehicle number and name at the time
when driver reaches the hospital for dropping the patients
(Ambulance driver 2, BR).
Commission was also paid to diagnostic providers and some-
times medical stores, who in turn paid private facilities and govern-
ment doctors for referring patients to them, reportedly ranging from
30% to 70% of the patient fee. Diagnostic providers sometimes also
paid other allied providers for referrals:
We appointed a boy who used to stick pamphlets on the clinic of
those doctors who are ‘Jholachhap’ (unqualified/informally
trained) and those doctors used to send their patients to us with a
slip so that they can claim commission afterwards. If a patient is
known to the local RMPs, we give them concession (Diagnostic
provider 1, BR).
In contrast, some facilities said they never gave commissions,
and others that they had given up this practice due to its large and
increasing costs, with one doctor claiming that unaffordable com-
missions had led him to close his rural delivery practice. A few
agents like ASHAs and RMPs said they had rejected overtures made
by private facilities:
They had invited me few times, they asked me—Doctor Saab
[sir] please come for lunch. But I never went (RMP 2, BR).
Discussion
This study is the first to explore the market structure and competitive
strategies of private delivery providers in India. It revealed a rapidly
expanding and heterogeneous market, segmented by complexity of
care and clientele socio-economic status. The market generally con-
formed to the characteristics of monopolistic competition, with pri-
vate facilities reportedly facing strong competition from both the
public sector and other private providers, though there were areas of
relatively high concentration in urban areas and for some market seg-
ments. Providers were likely to be relatively sensitive to profit incen-
tives given that most facilities were owned by individual or
partnerships (implying little separation between ownership and man-
agement), and the very low numbers of non-profit organizations.
Barriers to entry into the market appeared relatively low for a health-
care market, reflecting poor regulatory enforcement and the small
scale of most facilities, as indicated by high recent entry. However,
some barriers still existed in terms of the reputation of well-
established providers, and poor availability of qualified staff and con-
sultants outside the cities. Price competition was reportedly quite in-
tense competition, reflecting the price sensitivity of clients in a context
of very low-insurance coverage and generally low socio-economic
status. However, non-price competition was a key feature of the mar-
ket, with providers seeking to maintain and increase market share by
product differentiation on aspects of care observable to patients such
as medical infrastructure, hotel features and staff reputation.
However, the potential for clients to judge clinical quality of delivery
care either before or after delivery is likely to have been very low,
leading many providers to rely heavily on marketing and commission
payments to attract patients.
A key challenge for the study was the initial identification of
delivery facilities. We conducted an intensive mapping exercise to ad-
dress this, but it is likely that those most hidden or least willing to ac-
knowledge conducting deliveries would be lower-level facilities. There
may also have been a few rural facilities outside block centres which
our mapping did not cover. This could have somewhat biased up-
wards our estimates of qualifications and infrastructure though IDIs
and informal conversations indicated that nearly all facilities were
captured. Data collection covered issues that were sensitive from com-
mercial, ethical and regulatory perspectives. We found considerable
indications of this in triangulating between the survey data and IDIs,
and across IDI respondents. For example, IDIs indicated higher prices
and less qualified staff than survey data. While some respondents
were clearly cautious about discussing topics such as facility registra-
tion, dual practice and commission payments, others discussed these
issues openly, indicating that they were considered normal.
The study covered five diverse districts but cannot be considered
representative of Uttar Pradesh state; in particular, we did not in-
clude the poorest districts where private deliveries are least common
(Government of India, 2014). Even greater care is needed in consid-
ering the applicability of the findings to other Indian states. Uttar
Pradesh has the second lowest State Domestic Product (GDP)
(Government of India, 2018–19) in India, and one would expect
wealthier states to have a more developed private market, facilities
with better infrastructure and staffing, higher insurance coverage,
and greater entry of hospital chains (Mony et al., 2013). Caution is
also needed in extrapolating these findings to markets for other
healthcare services. Given that 85% of study facilities also provided
general inpatient care, there are likely to be many similarities be-
tween delivery care and other inpatient services in terms of market
segmentation by sophistication of services, price packages (which
are elastic and negotiable), low-insurance coverage and out-of-
pocket payments (often without bills), commissions for referrals,
and heavy reliance on visiting consultants. However, our facility
mapping indicated that markets for outpatient services are very dif-
ferent, reflecting the >10-fold higher number of facilities. Further
research on competition is therefore warranted both in settings with
different income levels and for different health services.
Turning to the implications for accessibility, delivery facilities
were highly clustered, leading to a crowded marketplace in urban and
peri-urban centres, with intense competition, particularly among mid-
level facilities. Outside these more urban areas, geographical accessi-
bility was much lower, especially for C-section and intensive care, and
staff were less qualified. One might expect government facilities to fill
this gap, but in practice rural public C-section provision was very lim-
ited, meaning that many women travelled substantial distances for de-
livery care—either electively or in an emergency.
In terms of financial accessibility, typical prices reported in the
survey ranged from USD 50 to 120 for normal deliveries, and USD
130–250 for C-sections, with IDIs indicating that prices may have
been higher in practice; these facilities would be unaffordable to a
large share of the population. Even for middle-income clients, the
economic burden was potentially high, especially for C-sections,
given the very low private insurance coverage.
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We did not assess clinical quality, but others have documented
major concerns with the quality of private and public sector care for
delivery and more generally (Das et al., 2012; Sharma et al., 2017).
Quality concerns identified in this study included lack of qualified med-
ics and nurses on staff, and heavy reliance on visiting consultants. This
allowed costly specialist resources to be spread across many clustered
facilities, but using consultants rather than full-time staff may affect
timeliness and continuity of care, maintenance of quality standards,
and supervision of junior staff, with consultants likely to be under sub-
stantial time pressure. Reliance on busy consultants, especially obstetri-
cians covering several facilities, could also be one reason for high C-
section rates in private facilities, reflecting the desire to plan the timing
of delivery (Peel et al., 2018). One reason for relying on consultants
was the highly fragmented nature of the markets, with most facilities
performing very few deliveries (median of 14 per month). Even though
specialist staff such as surgeons and anaesthetists might also have had a
role in other procedures, low delivery numbers would have reduced the
capacity of facilities to pay full-time specialist staff. More generally, it
has been noted that provision of high-quality maternity care requires a
relatively high caseload, so that clinicians regularly see key complica-
tions, and therefore maintain skills in managing these (Kruk et al.,
2016). The degree to which these benefits are reaped by busy consul-
tants covering many hospitals is unclear.
Another key concern was the referral policy in government facili-
ties unable to cater for delivery complications, which left high-risk
women at the mercy of private facilities and agents with a strong fi-
nancial stake in their referral location. This hampered continuity of
care at this key stage, and could lead to poor choices of private
facilities, and/or substantial financial burdens to women who had
planned a free government delivery. More generally, commission
payments for bringing patients to facilities were common and high,
a widespread phenomenon in India, despite being outlawed by the
Medical Council of India Code of Ethics (Medical Council of India,
2002; Krishnan, 2014). These payments may have pushed up prices,
and potentially compromised quality of care, if agents took patients
where their commission was highest, rather than where they thought
quality was best. Facilities that saw their clientele as price sensitive,
may also have compromised the quality of their care in order to
keep prices low in the face of hefty commissions.
These findings highlight several potential areas of intervention.
First, considering that less than half the delivery facilities were regis-
tered, a key foundation would be universal registration, facilitating as-
surance of minimum standards and targeting of quality improvement
initiatives. Despite the official adoption of the Clinical Establishments
Act in Uttar Pradesh mandating this, the Act is yet to be implemented,
reflecting major political challenges in increasing regulation in the
medical sector, and the contested roles of AYUSH providers.
Secondly, there is a major lack of quality improvement strategies,
with almost no delivery-related training for private providers, and very
limited coverage of broader strategies. While existing accreditation
schemes were out of reach of all but the highest-end facilities, such
schemes could play an important role in quality improvement and qual-
ity signalling if linked with insurance empanelment, and adapted to the
context of mid-level facilities (Montagu and Goodman, 2016). The
National Accreditation Board for Hospitals (NABH) and Healthcare
Providers (2016) has introduced a step-wise system beginning with a
pre-accreditation Entry level certificate which represents important pro-
gress. However, the fragmented nature of the market implies that
engaging in facility-by-facility quality improvement is a substantial chal-
lenge, unless there is greater consolidation of the market and/or careful
targeting of facilities. Consolidation might be encouraged through more
effective regulation, incentivising facilities to merge in order to meet
staffing and infrastructure requirements, or through third-party payers
prioritizing larger facilities or facility networks for empanelment.
However, concern has been expressed about overpricing and malpracti-
ces in corporatized Indian hospitals (Rao, 2018), and such strategies
could further reduce access and affordability, especially for the least
served populations. An alternative could be to target facilities for quality
improvement initiatives based on their local market share, with our ana-
lysis showing that the busiest facilities were responsible for a relatively
high share of the private delivery market in most of the areas studied.
Turning to demand-side strategies, improving patient informa-
tion could reduce the need for commission-earning agents, and im-
prove quality of care, e.g. through independently verified facility
report cards, or mobile/online information and review platforms.
Demand could also be influenced by expansion of subsidized third-
party payment mechanisms within the private sector, combined with
strategic purchasing of more complex care, as proposed under the
recently announced ‘National Health Protection Scheme’ of
Ayushman Bharat (Chatterjee, 2018). However, the widespread bur-
eaucratic challenges which discouraged private facilities from partic-
ipating in RSBY and JSY would need to be addressed (Yadav et al.,
2017). Specific contracting mechanisms could also be considered to
subsidize emergency referrals from primary level government facili-
ties to appropriate private providers in areas where higher level gov-
ernment services are not available within a reasonable distance.
Finally, providers are heavily affected by competition, and for
most private providers the government sector remained a key com-
petitor. This implies that an appropriately financed and good quality
public sector is likely to be one of the most important influences on
not only public but also private sector performance.
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